| Title | Author | Created | Published | Tags | | --------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | | Chapter 2 - Legacy Security | <ul><li>Jon Marien</li></ul> | January 16, 2025 | January 16, 2025 | [[#classes\|#classes]], [[#SYST4499\|#SYST4499]] | # Outline - [Legacy Security (802.11)](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security.md#Legacy%20Security%20(802.11)) - [Authentication](Authentication%20&%20Authorization.md#Authentication) - [Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Encryption](#Wired%20Equivalent%20Privacy%20(WEP)%20Encryption) - [Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)](#Virtual%20Private%20Networks%20(VPNs)) - [MAC Filters](#MAC%20Filters) - [SSID Cloaking/Hiding](#SSID%20Cloaking/Hiding) - [SSID Segmentation](#SSID%20Segmentation) ## Legacy Security (802.11) - It allows legacy client access. - It provides backward compatibility with exiting equipment. - It can be the weak spot of the network. - Standard Legacy 802.11 security means: - Open System Authentication, Shared Key Authentication, WEP Encryption. - Non-Standard Legacy 802.11 security means: - VPN over Wireless, MAC Filtering, SSID Segmentation, SSID Cloaking/Hiding. ## Legacy Authentication - **Methods** - Open System Authentication - Shared Key Authentication - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Encryption - Pre-Shared Keys - **Status**: Deprecated - **DO NOT USE THESE** ### Open System Authentication - Two-way exchange between the client STAs and the AP: - Client STA sends an authentication request. - AP then sends an authentication response. - It can use WEP for data encryption after authentication ### OS-Auth Messages ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-08-15.webp) **Authentication Methods: Radio and User ^ v** #### OSA and 802.11X/EAP Authentication ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-08-54.webp) ### Shared Key Authentication - It uses WEP encryption for authentication. - Client STA and AP should be configured with the static WEP key. - Authentication will not work if the keys do not match. #### SK-Auth Messages ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-18-09.webp) ##### SK-Auth: **Weaknesses** - If the cleartext challenge phrase and encrypted challenge phrase in the response is captured, then the static WEP key *might* be derived ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-19-37.webp) ### Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Encryption - Layer 2 encryption method - Use ARC4 (**RC4, Rivest Cipher 4, "Alleged RC4**) - Encrypts the **layers 3-7** & **LLC sublayer** - Payload of 802.11 data frame - MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) - Can use either a 40-bit or 104-bit user-supplied key - Prepends a 24-bit **Initialization Vector (IV)** to user's key ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-33-51.webp) - IV is sent in cleartext and new IV is created for every frame. - There are "**only**" **16,777,216** possible IVs. - Overtime, IVs are repeated. - Static WEP key can be entered in hex or ASCII characters - Some APs and STAs support up to 4 keys - Use or select the default transmission key. ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-39-28.webp) #### STAs and AP Encryption and Decryption ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-40-28.webp) #### WEP Services - [Data Integrity](#Data%20Integrity) - [Confidentiality](#Confidentiality) - [Access Control WEP](#Access%20Control%20WEP) ##### Data Integrity A data integrity checksum known as the **Integrity Check Value (ICV)** is computed on data before encryption and used to prevent data from being modified. ##### Confidentiality The primary goal of confidentiality was to provide data privacy by encryption the data before transmission. ##### Access Control WEP Client stations that do not have the same matching static WEP key as an access point are refused access to network resources. #### WEP Encryption Process - RC4- Rivet Cipher - Stream Cipher ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-41-33.webp) #### WEP Weaknesses It has been deprecated since it is easily cracked using **freeware**! ### Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) - Designed to replace the WEP until strong encryption was available. - No need for legacy equipment replacement, but a **firmware upgrade** instead. - Also based on ARC4 Encryption/Decryption. - Temporal Keys - Uses dynamic keys instead of static ones. - Sequencing - Uses a TKIP sequence counter (TSC) to avoid replay attacks. - Key Mixing - Two-phase cryptographic mixing process to produce a stronger seed to ARC4. - Enhanced data integrity - Uses a stronger data integrity check known as **Messaged Integrity Code (MIC)** < same as **MAC**. - TKIP Countermeasures (IF MIC FAILS) - Alarm is raised! - Logging - 60-sec shutdown - New temporal keys - Easily cracked with freeware tools ### MAC Filters - Almost all wireless APs implement access control - Through **Media Access Control (MAC)** address filtering - Implementing restrictions - A device can be *permitted* into the network - A device can be *prevented* from the network - Vulnerable solution since MAC can be easily spoofed and impersonated. ### Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) - No longer recommended practice for WLAN security, but often implemented since the VPN server is already deployed in the wired network. - The solution calls for a Firewall (FW) between the WLAN client and the VPN server - FW allows only VPN traffic to pass - VPN client encrypts (decrypts) traffic which is decrypted (encrypted) by the VPN server. ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-17-56-03.webp) - VPN suffers from two major drawbacks for WLAN security - Configuration complexity - Scalability - **Recommendations** - For remote access, when client STAs connect to the enterprise from a public WLAN. ### SSID Cloaking/Hiding - SSID stands for **Service Set Identifier**. - Logical name of the WLAN. - Removes the SSID from Beacon frames, then STAs that do not know the SSID will not associate to it. - Passive Scan will not reveal the SSID, but active scans will. - Do not secure the WLAN. - Might cause problems for the WLAN Administration. - **Recommendation**: Broadcast the SSID! ### SSID Segmentation - It is a common practice to create different SSIDs for different types of users - SSIDs are typically mapped into individual VLANs leading to multiple SSIDs per AP - **Consequence** - Users are segmented by the SSID/VLAN pair - **Recommendation** - Enterprise APs might support up to 16 SSIDs, each of which is mapped into a VLAN. - Layer 2 overhead is considerable when 16 SSIDs are lifted, leading to a **40%** performance reduction. - **Best Practice** - 3-4 SSIDs. #### SSID Segmentation Example - **Guest SSID/VLAN** - Open access. - Deny access to local network resources. - Routed off to an Internet Gateway. - **Voice SSID/VLAN** - Use WPA2 encryption. - VoWiFi clients are routed to VoIP server. - **Employee SSID/VLAN** - Strong security solutions like WPA2 encryption. - ACLs or FWs to access network resources after authentication ![](Chapter%202%20-%20Legacy%20Security-January-16th-2025-18-05-36.webp)